Introduction to Game Theory

Relations:

It is not possible to register for the course 32BE-P-GAME-01 if the student is concurrently registered for or has already completed the course U63E0101 (mutually exclusive courses).

During a review of study plans, the course U63E0101 can be substituted for the course 32BE-P-GAME-01.

Course guarantor:

Lecturer:

Tutor:

Supervisor:

Institute of Economic Studies

Synopsis:

Teaching Strategy: The course is taught in English and is set on specialized foreign literature sources which might not be generally available in the university bookstore or library. However, students are not required to use the original textbooks to prepare for the course. Instead, after each lecture they will be provided with slide presentations and academic articles in pdf format containing all the basic knowledge which needs to be mastered for successful performance on the homework assignments and the final test.

Requirements:

Grading: The overall course grade will be computed by converting into a grade-point score the total number of points gained from active participation in class (20%), doing four homework assignments (20%), and final (60%) written problem-solving test.

Syllabus of lectures:

Week 1Slot 1 (2 hours)1.1. Static Games of Complete Information

Week 2Slot 2 (2 hours)1.2. Economic Application: Cournot versus Bertrand Model of Duopoly

Week 3Slot 1 (2 hours)2.1. Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information (HW 1 due)

Week 4Slot 2 (2 hours)2.2. Economic Application: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly

Week 5Slot 1 (2 hours)2.3. Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information (HW 2 due)

Week 6Slot 2 (2 hours)2.4. Economic Application: Bank Runs, Imperfect International Competition

Week 7Slot 1 (2 hours)2.5. Repeated Games

Week 8Slot 2 (2 hours)2.6. Economic Application: Collusion between Cournot Duopolists

Week 9Slot 1 (2 hours)3.1. Static Games of Incomplete Information (HW 3 due)

Week 10Slot 2 (2 hours)3.2. Economic Application: First and Second-bid Auctions

Week 11Slot 1 (2 hours)4.1. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information (HW 4 due)

Week 12Slot 2 (2 hours)4.2. Economic Application: Limit Pricing Signalling (Milgrom&Roberts1982)

Week 13Slot 1 (2 hours)5.1. Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Syllabus of tutorials:

Study Objective:

Learning Strategy: During the lectures students get familiar with basic economic terms and concepts using their own real-life intuition about the market relations between buyers and sellers (demand and supply sides). Therefore, they are not required to have in advance some special knowledge in the fields of philosophy or history of economic science. To pass successfully, during the course students should develop and demonstrate ability to identify the key characteristics of a particular market situation, to relate it to one of the main standard models studied in class and to apply that model to find the correct market equilibrium solution (i.e. the optimal set(s) of possible decisions of the parties actively engaged in the market) according to the theory.

Study materials:

1.GIBBONS, R. (1992) - A Primer in Game Theory, Pearson Academic. ISBN: 9780745011592.

2.OSBORNE, M.J. (2011), Introduction to Game Theory (9th edition). Oxford University Press. ISBN: 019512895-8.

3.SHY, Oz (1996) Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. ISBN 978-0262691796.

4.Selected academic articles (to be added)

Note:

Further information:

No time-table has been prepared for this course

The course is a part of the following study plans:

• B-EM-P prezenční studium od 20/21 (compulsory elective course)
• B-EM-P prezenční studium od 21/22 (compulsory elective course)